OpenAI 对 Hugging Face 意外攻击事件的时间线浮出水面

Agent 已在 Artifactory 中获得远程代码执行能力，而 Artifactory 运行于容器即服务环境中。Agent 通过探索其本地环境，确定所在机器使用的 Linux 内核版本存在一个非常新的 CVE，从而在本地实现权限提升。它们下载该 CVE 的利用程序，对其进行定制以便能在该机器上成功运行，并借助这个已知的 Linux 内核权限提升 CVE 将本地机器权限提升至 root——在本案例中，是 PTE fizzroot。一旦在单台机器上获得 root 权限，Agent 就迅速提升权限，并在整个容器即服务基础设施环境中横向移动。特别是，Agent 持续利用留言板共享凭证、技术和进展；它们能够有效利用自身的并发性与并行性，非常快速地推进。它们通过 IMDS 获取 IAM 凭证。它们利用 Kubernetes 服务账户配置错误，尤其是特定服务账户被过度授权的问题，并且收集集群凭证，其中包括 Azure Key Vault。Agent 最终获得该集群的 cluster admin 权限及相关凭证。

The agents have remote code execution in Artifactory, which is running in a container-as-a-service environment. The agents privilege-escalate locally by exploring their local environment and determining that the Linux kernel version of the machine they are running on had a very recent CVE. They download the exploit for the CVE, customize it to succeed on the machine, and privilege-escalate to root on the local machine using this known Linux kernel privilege escalation CVE — in this case, PTE fizzroot. Once they have root on a single machine, agents rapidly escalate privileges and move laterally throughout the container-as-a-service infrastructure environment. In particular, agents are using the message board consistently to share credentials, techniques, and progress, and they’re able to effectively leverage their concurrency and parallelism to move quite rapidly. They obtain IAM credentials via IMDS. They exploit Kubernetes service account misconfigurations, in particular over-permissioning of specific service accounts, and they harvest cluster credentials, including Azure Key Vault. Agents eventually obtain cluster admin on the cluster and associated credentials.