When LLM Agents Negotiate: Private Information and Dynamic Bargaining in Supply Chains
英文标题：When LLM Agents Negotiate: Private Information and Dynamic Bargaining in Supply Chains
arXiv:2608.07538v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As LLM agents move from decision support to autonomous procurement, firms need to know whether delegated negotiators create value, divide it predictably, and avoid money-losing contracts. We study this in a canonical supply chain bargaining problem: a
打开原文相关 6.4 · 机会 1
2.1 KB
612 B
380 B
9.1 KB
32.7 KB
22.8 KB
24.2 KB
34.7 KB
中文
arXiv:2608.07538v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As LLM agents move from decision support to autonomous procurement, firms need to know whether delegated negotiators create value, divide it predictably, and avoid money-losing contracts. We study this in a canonical supply chain bargaining problem: a
中文全文翻译正在补齐，可先查看下方英文原文。
English / 原文
BibTeX formatted citation
×